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Abstract 
This paper attempts to determine the factors affecting repayment performance in microfinance programs in Malaysia by using a 
multinomial logit regression model. The data used in this study is gathered through a survey on 309 respondents of TEKUN 
Nasional clients in Peninsular Malaysia. Results of the study indicate that gender, formal religious education, distance to the 
lender office, business formality, total sales per month, total loan received, loan monitoring and loan disbursement lag have 
ent performance. The result also shows that no pressure from Microfinance Institutions 
to pay the loan may cause the clients delayed their payment or just pay at a minimum amount. Besides, 11 percent of respondents 
also admitted that they not fully utilised the loan given for business that makes them finally default. The study suggests rebate 
should be given to the good borrowers to encourage them to repay their loan on schedule without delay and the establishment of 
a formal specialized microfinance banking institution to cater for the financial needs of micro and small entrepreneurs, especially 
in Malaysia.  
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1. Introduction 
funds to the lower-income group which are usually involved in small and micro business activities. The MFIs 
provide funds for start-up business or for working capital purpose such as to buy raw materials, machine and 
business equipment. Majorities of MFIs are from semi-formal institutions and informal institutions that are not 
profit-oriented organisation. Usually they receive funds from government, local government and donors to run their 
activities. Therefore, many of MFIs are not sustainable and too dependent on subsidies.  However, MFIs should be 
sustainable and viable to make sure they can continually provide financing to small and micro entrepreneurs without 
depending on donors and government. Financial sustainability is a prerequisite for making micro financial services 
permanent as well as widely available (ICC, 2001). The repayment performance is important to make sure that the 
MFIs are operated in a sustainable basis. It is therefore, the objective of this paper is to determine the factors 
affecting repayment performance in microfinance programs in Malaysia, which using individual lending approach. 
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Repayment performance refers to the total loans paid on time as stated in the loan agreement contract. Godquin 
(2004) defines repayment performance in terms of binary variable; based on an arbitrary definition of what 
le, Guttman (2007) measures 
repayment performance based on the degree of arrears.  
2. Literature Review 
The majority of literature on repayment performance of MFIs focused on group-based lending or group liability 
because the group-based lending is a synonym with microfinance activities such as Ghatak & Guinnane (1999), 
Godquin (2004), Sharma & Zeller (1997), Zeller, (1998), Besley & Coates (1995), and Silwal (2003). Much 
theorising has been done to show the advantages of group loan in minimising the default rate compared to an 
individual loan (Ghatak, 2000; Ghatak & Guinnane, 1999; Besley & Coate, 1995; Maata, 2004).  Much of the study 
emphasized the role of joint liability in group lending, such as peer selection (Ghatak, 1999), peer monitoring 
(Stiglitz, 1990; Varian, 1990; Banerjee et al., 1994), and peer enforcement (Besley & Coates, 1995). It proved that 
through group lending, it could mitigate moral hazard, adverse selection and information asymmetries faced by the 
MFIs. Microfinance programs that used peer selection, peer monitoring, dynamic incentives, regular repayment 
schedules, and social collateral help maintains high repayment rates (Silwal, 2003). However, little study has been 
conducted on the issue of the credit worthiness of the individual lending design applied by microfinance institutions. 
Research on the determinants of loan repayment defaults in individual-based lending schemes can be found only for 
rural banks or semi-formal financial institutions (Suraya Hanim Mokhtar, 2011). 
However, in the recent studies, the results have been shifted. Armendariz de Aghion & Morduch (2000) argue 
that direct monitoring, regular repayment schedules, and the uses of non-refinancing threats are the elements to 
generate high repayment rates from low income borrowers without requiring collateral and without using group 
lending contracts that feature joint liability. Chowdhury (2005) theoretically shows that without sequential 
financing, group lending may suffer from under-monitoring with borrowers investing in risky projects. The most 
important factor inciting lending groups to repay is the relative value they attach to access to future credit (Diagne et 
al., 2000). Mersland & Strom (2008) find that MFI tends to choose group lending when its main market is rural, 
when it prefers female borrowers, and when the average loan amount is small. The studies show that group-based 
lending approach cannot ensure high repayment rate in MFIs. There are several reasons behind high default rates 
such as the borrowers unwilling or unable to repay the loan (Greenbaum & Thakor, 1995; Coyle, 2000). Sterns 
(1995) argued that the cause of high level of non-repayment rates is the lender itself not the borrower. She also 
sasters and personal crises affecting the ability to 
repay a loan. 
3. Research Methodology 
The study chooses micro finance programs offered by Tekun Nasional (TN) because TN is the largest 
microfinance institution in Malaysia that offers microfinance based on individual lending approach. Data of 309 
respondents were obtained through a multistage random sampling in Peninsular Malaysia that was conducted from 
November 2010 to February 2011. The study used mixed methods, which include a questionnaire surveys among 
participants, structured interview with TN staffs and interview and participant observation for selected participants. 
The mixed method is considered to be very efficient in answering research questions compared to the quantitative 
and qualitative approached when used in isolation (Creswell, 2002). Furthermore, by using a mixed method 
approach at different stages of research, any bias that exists in any single method can neutralize or remove the biases 
For the analytical purpose, the repayment statuses were classified into three categories namely paid on time for the 
borrowers who repaid as at when due, delinquency for the borrowers who repaid late from the due date or repaid 
less than the appropriate amount  and default for the borrowers who not paid after three months of the due date. The 
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data is based on their credit status on sampling date. The variables which significantly affect repayment performance 
are determined as follows: 
Y = f (gender, age, educationlvl, religiousedu, totalincome, distance, registerSSM, totalsales, TotalLoan, 
visitbuspremise, loanapproval) 
Where, 
Y = repayment performance with values reflecting the repayment status of the borrowers either 1 (paid on time), 2 
(delinquency) and 3 (default). 
Gender   =  sex of the borrower (1 for male and 2 for female) 
Age   = age of the borrowers (in years) 
Educationlvl                   = education level of borrowers ( 1 for secondary and below and 2 for certificate/diploma  
and above) 
Religiousedu  =  borrowers have formal religious education (1 for yes and 2 for no) 
Totalincome  =  Monthly total household income (in RM) 
Distance   =  distance of borrowers business premise with lender office (in km) 
RegisterSSM                    1    
for yes and 2 for no) 
Totalsales  =  monthly total sales (in RM) 
TotalLoan  =  Total loan received 
Visitbuspremise  business premise in a month 
Loanapproval  =  either loan approval as promised (1 for yes and 2 for no) 
 The study used multinomial logit regression method where multinomial logit regression exists to handle the case 
of dependents with more classes and does not have a natural ordering. In this study, the dependent variable was 
divided into three ordinal variables defined as follows: yt = 1 if there is no repayment problem and yt  = 2 if exist 
delinquency and yt = 3 if exist default. The study follows Mlogit technique by Menard (2001), and Borooah (2001). 
4. Data Analysis and Discussion 
The mean age of the respondents is 42 and most of the respondents are married. 178 respondents are female, and 
the rests are males who contribute 131 from total respondents. In terms of education level, the majority of 
respondents just finish their secondary school and below. The average of respondents has nine-year business 
experience and the average of total household income per month is RM4, 453 (USD1484). In terms of business 
location, the majority of respondents operate their business in rural areas where most of them involved in services 
and retail activities such as retail shop, hawker stalls, salon and restaurant. Based on 309 respondents, 151 (49%) 
respondents are categorised as good borrowers, while 103 (33%) respondents are in arrears and 55 (18%) 
respondents are default borrowers.  
In terms of factors affecting repayment performance in microfinance program in Malaysia, the result shows that 
age, formal religious education, total income, business formality has a negative coefficient while, gender, business 
experience, distance to the lender office, number of time visit and loan approval have a positive coefficient as shown 
in Table 1. A positive coefficient indicates that the variables are associated with a higher probability of being in the 
on-time paid category than that of being in the default category. On the other hand, a negative coefficient indicates 
that the variables are associated with a lower probability of being in the on-time paid category than that of the 
default category. The result shows that formal religion education, total income, register with SSM, total sale, total 
loan, and loan approval has higher probability of being in the good borrowers than in the bad borrowers. While 
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gender, age, education level, distance to the lender office, and loan monitoring have lower probability of being in the 
good borrowers than in the bad borrowers. However, only five variables are statistically significant namely 
RelegiosEdu, Distance, TotalSales, TotalLoan, and VisitBusPremise.   
The result shows that borrowers who have formal religious education are more responsible to repay their loan. 
This is because in Islam, responsible to pay debt is highly important where even the borrowers were dead, they still 
have to pay their debt or their spirit will be hanging. The finding also shows that distance from the lender office with 
revious 
microfinance research (Bhatt & Tang, 2002; Oke et al.; Derban et al.) where the closer to the lender office, the 
to the lender, a
borrowers to repay their loan. In terms of total sales, the result shows that borrowers who earned more profit are 
more creditworthy. The result is in line with studies that have been done by Von Pischke (1991) and Nannyonga 
(2000). While, the higher the total loan received by the borrowers, the higher probability of borrowers to pay their 
loan on time. This is because the borrowers have enough funds to finance their business that makes them get more 
profit and increase their business profile.  
In the delinquent category, variable gender, register with SSM, total sales and loan approval are statistically 
significant. The result shows that borrowers who not register their business with SSM, and earned less profit are 
more likely to be in default category. With regards to gender, the finding shows that female borrowers have higher 
probability of being in the delinquent category. The result is contradicted with the most previous result that found 
female borrowers are more creditworthy than male borrowers such as Sharma & Zeller (1997), Papias & Ganesan 
(2008), Derban et al., (2005), and Roslan & Mohd Zaini (2009). This situation happened because of some of the 
women entrepreneurs in this study might have been engaged in high risk or low return activities or have personal 
problems such as divorced, husband death, and giving birth that disrupt their business activities.  Besides, the study 
shows that period of loan approva
 
Besides, the study also found 11 percent of respondents admitted that they not fully utilised the loan given for 
business that makes them finally default. In addition, little pressure from the lender may reduce the delinquent and 
default problem where the study found that no pressure from MFI to pay the loan may cause the clients delayed their 
loan.  
Table 1: Multinomial Logit Estimate of Loan Repayment Performance 
Variables  Delinquents Defaulters 
  Coefficient   Z Coefficient   Z 
Gender 0.503820 * 1.812 0.351021 0.9480 
Age -0.0131937 -0.8445 0.0110987 0.5647 
Educationlvl -0.0994683 -0.2644 0.216584 0.4061 
ReligiousEdu -0.311414 -1.285 -0.628734 ** -2.039 
TotalIncome -2.05458E-05 -0.6335 -0.000148827 -1.622 
Distance 0.0180713 1.415 0.0492854 *** 3.109 
RegisterSSM -1.238900 ** -2.225 -0.498542 -0.8123 
TotalSales -0.000143 ** -2.176 -0.000461264 ** -2.475 
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TotalLoan 0.0000168 1.034 0.0000617145 *** 3.364 
Visitbuspremise 0.256011 0.1720 0.256011 ** 2.124 
LoanApproval -0.203023 * 1.767 -0.203023 -0.5043 
 
*** Significant @ 1% level, ** significant @ 5% level, * significant @ 10% level 
Likelihood ratio test: Chi-square(22) = 84.8782 [0.0000] 
 
5. Conclusions and Recommendations 
The study analysed the factors affecting repayment performance in microcredit programs in Malaysia. The study 
uses a sample from TEKUN Nasional programs. The result of the study shows that there are ten factors that 
affecting the repayment performance of the borrowers namely age, gender, business experience, religious education, 
total household income, total sales, distance to the lender office, the formality of business, period of loan approval 
and loan monitoring. The study found that improvement in income and total sales will increase the repayment 
performance of borrowers. Therefore, by providing training to the borrowers such as how to market their products, 
financial management and accounting course will help them improve their business and increase their profits. The 
study suggests TN give a rebate to the good borrowers to encourage them to repay their loan on schedule without 
ying full amount on time or delay the 
payment. Besides, the study suggests the establishment of a formal specialized microfinance banking institution to 
cater for the financial needs of micro and small entrepreneurs especially in Malaysia that used both group lending 
and individual lending approach. The study found that small credit given to the microentrepreneurs was helping 
them improve their business and encouraged the poor to involve in business activities. 
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